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Abstract  
The Modem Interface Services is a software system that provides bridge solution for the 
modem in Android mobile platform developed by ST-Ericsson. The functions of the 
Modem Interface Service are implemented using different software components.   
The goal of this master thesis was to perform security analysis on the Android mobile 
platform developed by ST-Ericsson. The main objectives were to detect security 
vulnerabilities in the core component that integrates the modem into Android platform. 
In performing this analysis, three security analysis methodologies were employed. 
TVRA methodology was used to identify architectural vulnerabilities whiles static code 
analysis was applied to find vulnerabilities due to implementation errors.  In order to 
show different means of exploiting the weaknesses in the component, attack trees 
methodology was employed to discover vulnerabilities due to design errors as well as 
implementation flaws. 
The use of these methods made it possible to identify vulnerabilities in the target 
component and its environment. Based on the results obtained, possible mitigations 
strategies were proposed. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Mobile devices technology has evolved rapidly in recent years leading to increased 
resources, high connectivity and usable interfaces. This development also results in the 
rise in application development and distribution for mobile devices. With the advent of 
Android open platform, every mobile platform developer uses different software design 
to integrate the modem which provides platform services [6, 27].  In line with this, ST- 
Ericsson also developed Modem Interface Services (MIS).  
The MIS is a software system developed to provide bridge solution for the modem to 
be integrated into a Linux Host system. The MIS consists of many components. Each 
component has a specific function in the platform and contributes to over all purpose of 
the MIS. This thesis is focusing on security analysis of the MIS and the interfacing 
modem. 
 
1.1 Background Information 
The MIS is designed to integrate the modem into Android platform. There are many 
components that constitute the MIS. The Radio Interface Layer (RIL) component in the 
MIS is the main component integrating the modem in Android [27]. Its function is to 
enable the modem supported services. It uses AT command to invoke and control the 
modem services. Figure 1 presents architectural view of the telephony and the RIL 
interfaces in Android. As seen in the figure, the RIL interface in Android is divided into 
three modules. The first module is a generic RIL and it forms part of the Android 
application framework. The RIL daemon is the second unit and the vendor RIL is the 
third component. The RIL daemon receives all RIL related requests and forwards them 
to the vendor RIL. The vendor RIL in the architecture is modem specific and its 
implementation depends on the modem. The RIL component in MIS correspond to 
vendor RIL module in figure 1 and it is the focus of this analysis. The RIL is 
responsible for receiving all the requests from Android telephony framework and maps 
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the requests to the right AT commands. The commands are then forwarded to the 
modem. Similarly, AT commands received from the modem are changed to 
corresponding replies for Android telephony framework to understand [27]. 
          
           
APPLICATIONS
ANDROID APP FRAMEWORK
Telephony Framework
RIL
Phone Applications
MIDDLEWARE
(User Space Libraries)
RIL Daemon
Vendor RIL
KERNEL HW Interface Driver 
MODEM
 
             Figure 1: Architectural view of telephony framework and RIL interfaces in Android 
 
                                     This figure is drawn based on the one in [27] 
 
 
The RIL is designed to support all the mandatory APIs in accordance with the Host 
operating system telephony API specification [6].  
In Android, the operating system manages access to system resources. However, if this 
is not managed precisely, it will affect the user or the resources on the mobile device. 
The restriction on access to resources can be realized using different means. Android 
uses permission –based security mechanisms to protect sensitive APIs. The protected 
APIs in Android comprises: 
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 Camera 
 Location data 
 Bluetooth functions 
 Telephony functions 
 SMS/MMS functions 
 Network/ data connections 
These APIs can only be accessed through the operating system. To use any protected 
resource on the mobile device, an application needs to define its capabilities in the 
manifest file. During installation of an application, the system shows the permissions 
asked for to the user and the user must approve them to continue with the installation 
[5, 24]. 
1.2 Problem and Research Questions 
Android is a Linux-based mobile platform which is programmed using Java. The 
platform has its own security mechanisms   designed for a mobile environment [5]. The 
unique security model of Android concentrates on putting the end user in control of the 
handset. Android platform makes it possible for third parties to develop applications 
that use mobile phone features and resources.  
Google has outlined a permission-based security model in Android platform [4]. Every 
application is required to make permission request in order to access stored data and the 
features of the phone. The permissions basically specify the capability a user may grant 
to an Android application. In other words, a user is allowed to assess the capability of 
the application and decide whether or not to install the application on his device. It is 
therefore important that the permission-based model is properly enforced in Android 
smartphones owing to the crucial role it plays in running Android applications. 
However, Android devices come from different manufacturers.  The open nature of the 
platform permits proprietary extensions and changes. These extensions and changes can 
improve or degrade the security mechanism of the platform. Therefore, analysis of a 
distribution of Android is an essential step in protecting information on that system [4, 
5] 
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The purpose of this master thesis is to analyze a variant of Android mobile platform 
developed by ST-Ericsson. The focus of the research is on security on the Modem 
Interface Services (MIS) and the interfacing Modem. The main objective is to 
determine weaknesses and threats (vulnerabilities) in the main Mobile Interface 
Services (MIS) component integrating the modem. 
This study covers mismatches between android and MIS with regard to the possibility 
of third party applications gaining unauthorized access to resources. 
Whenever appropriate, countermeasures will be proposed to mitigate the threats to the 
vulnerabilities that exist in the MIS component. 
Figure 2 shows an overview of the platform with a focus on the MIS, which consist of 
several supporting blocks for applications execution. The application systems are 
generally known as the Host and MIS is part of it. 
 
 
       
ModemHost
Modem Interface Services
Modem Software
 
                          Figure 2 Modem Interface Services Overview 
This figure is based on the official picture ST-Ericsson uses when showing relationship 
between the Host and the Modem. As shown in figure 1, MIS is an integral part of the 
Host. 
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Figure 3 depicts the position of the MIS on the Host and also shows the interface 
between the MIS and the Modem. The Modem consists of the hardware and software 
that provide the platform services to the external Host system. The MIS is the software 
component providing a bridge solution to the modem that is integrated to a Linux based 
Host system. The MIS can be considered as peripheral driver for the modem and does 
not contain any sensitive data. Nevertheless, if MIS components configuration files are 
tempered, it can lead to serious security problem. Any malicious changes in MIS 
components configuration files could make the whole device malfunction [6]. Hence 
the need to ensure that there is no vulnerability in the MIS components that can be 
exploited by attackers. 
 
Hardware
CAIF
Modem
Modem 
Software
Kernel 
(CAIF Driver)
Modem Interface 
Services (MIS) 
Components
Telephony
Applications
 
                                  Figure 3 Platform Overview 
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This figure is based on the official picture ST-ERICSSON uses when showing 
components in the Android platform. 
 
 
 
Research Questions 
How can the Modem Interface Services be analysed to identify vulnerabilities in the 
Radio Interface Layer component and its environment? 
Are they any mismatches between android and MIS components that will allow 
unauthorized access to resources? 
 
 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
 
 In [8], Andreas Sjöström et al. (2010) evaluated the security of Access Linux Platform 
(ALP) 2.4, whiles taking into consideration security problems in the Linux operating 
systems and the security structure of ALP 2.4. They analysed vulnerabilities in Linux 
platform and demonstrated that some of them are in ALP too. In their paper [8], they 
presented vulnerabilities in the platform and proposed corresponding countermeasures 
to mitigate them. 
In their paper [4], Michael Grace et al. analyzed eight popular Android smartphones 
and realized that the permission-based security model is not properly enforced. In this 
paper [4], Michael grace et al. stated that malicious application can delete user data, 
send SMS messages or record user conversation using this vulnerability. 
 
L. Davi et al.  Showed in their paper [16], that it is possible to mount privilege 
escalation attacks on Android platform. In this paper, L. Davi et al. detected transitive 
permission usage vulnerability in Android 2.0 and were able to escalate privileges 
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granted to application’s sandbox. They concluded that non-privilege Android 
applications can escalate privileges.   
In their paper, Google Android:  A Comprehensive Security Assessment [29], Asaf 
Shabtai et al.  assess the security of Android framework and identified possible threats 
to the platform. In this paper [number], Asaf Shabtai et al. indicate that it is possible for 
applications to exploit vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel or system libraries. They also 
mention the possibility of maliciously using permission granted to an installed 
application. In the same paper [29], Asaf Shabtai et al. mention that it is possible for an 
attacker to drain mobile device resources. 
 
1.4 Research Approach 
Software systems can be analysed for security vulnerabilities using different 
approaches. Vulnerabilities in software systems may be due to design flaws or 
implementation errors.  In this master thesis work, three main approaches will be used 
to carry out security analysis of the MIS.  
The first approach known as Threat Vulnerability and Risk Analysis (TVRA) technique 
[10], is the method that is used by ETSI standards developers in carrying out analysis of 
the threats, risks and vulnerabilities of telecommunications system. This method will be 
applied to detect vulnerabilities due to design flaws. 
The second approach that will be employed in analysing the platform for security 
vulnerabilities is static analysis. Auditing code manually is time consuming especially 
when complex software systems are involved. Therefore, static code analysis method 
will be used to analyze the MIS component for vulnerabilities due to implementation 
errors.  
 
 Attack trees method will also be employed in this research work. This method will 
make it possible to graphically show the relations between different attacks, how they 
can be carried out by attackers and the impact of the attacks on the whole system. This 
method can detect design flaws as well as implementation errors.  
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In chapter two, detailed information and discussion of the three approaches is made.  
1.5 Limitations and Key Assumptions 
This research work covers security analysis of the Modem Interface Services and the 
interfacing Modem. The study concentrates on identifying security vulnerabilities in 
Radio Interface Layer (RIL) that can be exploited in order to access the Modem. In this 
analysis, the Modem is the asset to protect whiles the Radio Interface Layer is the asset 
under analysis. Additionally, this research takes into account the security policy of 
Android platform alongside the security mechanisms adopted by ST-ERICSSON. 
However, the research does not cover analysis of Android security mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the scope of this research has not been to find vulnerabilities in all MIS 
components. That would have been rather an extensive undertaking requiring more time 
than that allocated to this thesis work.  The use of attack trees to do security analysis on 
systems has limitations [14]. Attack trees cannot be used to show the interaction 
between attacks performed on a system and the defences introduced to keep away 
attacks. As a result, there will be a limitation on the accuracy of analysing defensive 
measures. However, this method will enable me to show graphically the relations 
between different attacks on the RIL, how they can be performed and their impact on 
the system as a whole. Nevertheless, the intention is not to model every attack against 
the component.  
The limitation on the part of static code analysis is that all static analysis tools estimate 
their outputs which results in output that is not very good.  These tools can also give 
false positive or false negative results. 
 
1.6 Contributions to Knowledge 
This research will help to determine weaknesses in the MIS and interfacing Modem and 
find possible security threats that can be enacted by threat agents in order to exploit the 
vulnerabilities. Based on the identified vulnerabilities, countermeasures will be 
proposed to mitigate them.   The outcome from the research will be a contribution to the 
efforts to analyze the Linux- based mobile platform for security vulnerabilities. The 
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findings of the research will create awareness of security problems in the mobile 
platform that will be analysed. The proposal to mitigate the vulnerabilities that will be 
detected will contribute to provision of secure mobile services on the mobile platform. 
1.7 Thesis Report Outline 
The rest of the thesis report is arranged as follows: 
In chapter 2, the theoretical background of the master thesis work is presented. In this 
part of the report, detailed discussion about the three methods used for the analysis is 
made. It also contains exhaustive discussions on Android platform and the MIS. 
In chapter 3, the approach to the master thesis work is discussed. Here, detailed 
discussion about the methodologies and the tools used in the research is made. 
In chapter 4, the results of the analysis are presented in the form of applying the 
methodologies and the tools to the problem and obtaining the results. 
In chapter 5, the results obtained from the analysis in chapter 4 are discussed and 
proposed solutions the vulnerabilities identified are presented. 
In chapter 6, a brief summary of the problem, the approaches used and the results 
obtained is made.  The contributions made and information about further work are also 
presented in this part of the report. 
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CHAPTER 2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 Trust, Vulnerability and Risk Analysis (TVRA) Methodology 
The TVRA approach to analysing systems involves systematic identification and 
prevention of unwanted incidents in the system. The technique consist of identifying the 
assets in the system and finding the weakness associated with each of the assets. For 
each asset, the threat and the threat agents that will exploit the weakness of the asset are 
detected. The likelihood of attacks on the system vulnerabilities and their impact on the 
system are modelled. This helps to determine the risk to the system.  
The TVRA method is based on modeling.  A TVRA model takes into account the 
following factors: 
 Assets 
 Weaknesses 
 Threats 
 Threat agents 
 Unwanted incidents 
 Countermeasures 
 A weakness of an asset that has corresponding threat is considered to be vulnerability; 
hence vulnerability is modelled as a combination of weakness that can be exploited by 
one or more threats. To reduce the risk in the system, countermeasures are introduced in 
the model to give protection against threats to vulnerabilities [10]. 
2.1.1 TVRA Method Process 
 Analysis of Telecommunication system for security vulnerabilities using TVRA 
method is a process. The method process consists of ten steps that are specified for 
analysing a system [10]. Below are the TVRA method processes: 
1. Identification of Target of Evaluation (TOE). This consists of description of the main 
assets of the TOE and environment of the TOE. It also includes specifying the goal, 
purpose and scope of the TVRA.  
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2. Identification of security objectives. The outcome of this step is a high level 
statement of the security aims and issues that need to be sorted out.  
3. Functional security requirements are derived from the objectives from step two.  
4. Taking stock of the assets, taking into account high level asset description in step one 
and additional assets due to steps two and three.  
5. Vulnerabilities in the system are identified and classified. The threats that can exploit 
the vulnerabilities and the unwanted incidents that may result from the exploitation are 
also identified.  
6. Computing the likelihood of an attack and its impact.  
7. Determination of the risks.  
8. Finding the necessary countermeasures. The result of this step is a list of alternative 
security services and capabilities required to mitigate the risk.  
9. Making countermeasure cost-benefit analysis. This is done to identify the best 
appropriate security services and capabilities among the alternatives from step 8.  
10. Making specification of exhaustive requirements for the security services and 
capabilities from step 9.  
Each of the steps   in the method process has specific metrics outlined that will help the 
analyst to carry out security analysis of ICT system [10]. Specifically, repeatable 
metrics is used in step 6 to calculate the likelihood and impact values of attack.  Cost 
and benefit calculation of alternative countermeasures is done in similar fashion in step 
9. The repeatable metrics approach of calculating these values is necessary in that it 
allows for repeatability of the analysis over time.  
The product of the likelihood of an attack and the value of the impact on an asset gives 
indication of the risk to the asset. Introduction of a countermeasure will minimise the 
probability of success of a threat to an asset and lessen its impact. In step eight of the 
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process, the analyst identifies alternative countermeasures needed to protect the assets 
in the system. The objective of the cost and benefit evaluation in step nine is to 
determine the most effective countermeasure that can mitigate the effect of an attack at 
a reasonable cost. 
The knowledge of the security objectives of the asset and its environment is necessary 
to determine the type of protection   needed.  The   identified security objectives may be 
categorized into one of the following five groups: 
 Confidentiality 
 Integrity 
 Availability 
 Authenticity 
 Accountability 
Similarly, identified threats to a system may be classified into one of the following 
major groups: 
 Interception 
 Manipulation 
 Denial of service 
 Repudiation of sending 
 Repudiation of receiving 
The methods used to enact these threats are numerous and different [10]. 
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2.2 Static Code Analysis 
In the 1970’s, Stephen Johnson, then at Bell Laboratory developed a tool by name Lint 
to scan C source programs that had compiled devoid of errors in order to unearth bugs 
that had evaded detection [17].  
There are many methods that can be used to discover and lessen the number of errors in 
a program [17-18]. Requirements stage or use case phase of product development are 
better stages to check for flaws. These stages are however not developed for 
standardization. Many security weaknesses in programs occur during coding. Therefore 
it may be advantageous to make corrections after design stage [17, 18] 
While binary and byte code are not in human readable forms, it is possible for humans 
to read source code. Besides, many tools exist for analysing source codes. On account 
of these reasons, source code appears a fine place to start analysis [17]. 
Over the years, research has shown that code review is the best method to get rid of 
bugs in a program [18].  However, it is not always possible due to the difficulty 
involved in training people and organizing them to detect errors in programs. Moreover, 
it is time- consuming. 
Most errors in programs can be classified into categories [15, 17]. Therefore automated 
tools can be used to detect them in programs. Static analyzer is a program developed for 
analysing other programs for possible flaws. These tools are used to scan the source 
code of a program so as to match patterns. They examine the programs for errors 
without running them in a procedure called static code analysis. 
The success of Lint serves as pacesetter and has led to proliferation of static analysis 
tools, both open source and proprietary and they target different languages and 
operating systems. 
There are different types of static code checkers. Some are used to scan the source code 
of programs while others can examine compiled byte code.   
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While each static code analyzer functions differently, most of them have some 
characteristics in common. They all read the program and create certain model of it. 
The model then serves as a sort of abstract image that can be used to match error 
patterns. Static analysis tools also carry out data-flow analysis. In this process, they try 
to deduce likely values variables could store at particular points in the program. Data- 
flow analysis is very important when it comes to analysing program security 
vulnerability. Programs receive input from users. Each time the program accept input, 
there is a likelihood that attacker can use that input to destabilize the system [15, 17, 
18].   
There are many methods and techniques in static analysis. The main methods used in 
code analysis comprise the following: 
 Control Flow Analysis  
 Data Flow Analysis 
 Information Flow Analysis 
 Path Function Analysis (also called semantic analysis or symbolic execution) 
 Formal Verification (also called compliance analysis) 
Other techniques that can be used to analyze code of a program include syntax checks, 
range checking and timing analysis [20].  
2.2.2 Static Analysis Tools 
There exist a number of tools for performing static analysis.  These tools differ about 
the complexity of the analysis they can do. Some of them function on one or two 
languages.  Majority of the tools run on source code. Basically, static analysis tool 
converts the code into a language which it can interpret. The effectiveness of these tools 
depends on the rule set define for each of them.  The amount of rule sets also depends 
on the type of programming language [20]. 
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2.3 Attack Tree Methodology 
The attack trees concept was defined by Bruce Schneier in 1999, as a means of 
modeling threats on computer systems and the mode of using attacks to realize those 
threats. The basis of attack tree methodology is fault tree analysis [11, 14], which is a 
method used to comprehend the way systems can fail. 
Attack trees are ways of thinking and describing the security of systems and sub-
systems. They can also be described as a means of building an automatic database that 
serves as descriptions of the security of a system. The methodology can be applied in 
making decisions regarding how to improve security or minimise the effect of a new 
attack on a system [11, 25] 
In creating attack trees, the attacker’s objective forms the root node and is connected to 
sub-nodes which represent the possible attacks to accomplish the attacker’s main 
objective.  The leaf nodes correspond to attacker’s actions.  One attack tree represents 
one objective of the attacker. In any complex system, the root nodes are many and each 
represent a different goal. Thus in modelling attacks against a complex system, each 
attack objective has to get a different tree [14, 25]. Figure 4 shows a basic attack tree. 
 
                                          Figure 4:  Basic Attack Tree 
This diagram was drawn based on the official Attack tree diagram Bruce Schneier uses 
to illustrate attack on a safe. 
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The goal of the attack is to open a safe and nodes beneath the root node are the different 
means of achieving the goal. 
The “OR” nodes represent different means to achieve the same attack goal. For 
instance, to learn the combo you can either get the combo from the target OR find 
written combo. The “AND” nodes represent different actions to realize a goal. For 
example, to eavesdrop a message you need to get target to state the combo AND listen 
to conversation. 
An attack tree can be integral part of a larger attack tree. For instance, Figure 4 is part 
of a larger attack, whose goal is to read a document [25]. 
Possible attacks against a system can be modeled using attack tree. Once that is done, 
the tree can be used to analyze the attributes of the security of the system. A number of 
such attributes have been proposed by Bruce Schneier [12]. 
In order to use the tree to analyze the threats and attacks against a system, values are 
added to the leaf nodes [25]. The analysis of the system is done in two steps [12]. 
Firstly, the value for each leaf node is determined. Secondly, the value in non-leaf node 
is created from the values of its children. To determine the vulnerability of a system to 
an attack, the analyst examines the value of the root node to ascertain if the goal is 
vulnerable to attack. For instance, the presence of a possible Boolean value in the root 
node is an indication of the system’s vulnerability. Similarly, the analyst can verify if 
the system is vulnerable to a specific type of attack.  Furthermore, using attack tree, a 
security analyst will be able to obtain the assumptions on which a security system is 
based [12, 25]. 
 
2.4 Android Security Mechanism 
Generally, android integrates a number of security mechanisms into the framework 
[29]. These can be classified into three main groups as: 
 Linux mechanisms 
 Environmental features  
 Android specific mechanisms 
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2.4.1 Linux Mechanisms 
The Linux layer in Android platform implements two security mechanisms namely, the 
Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) users and file access. Users are the main 
components in these mechanisms.  A process or a file known as object is owned by a 
user. Furthermore, the users are allocated to groups [29] 
POSIX users 
In the case of POSIX users, every Android application installed on the mobile device is 
given a user ID. This means that two applications’ code can not run in the same process.  
This somewhat constructs a sandbox that precludes interference of applications with 
one another. Two applications need to share the same user ID in order to have the same 
permissions set and run in the same process. This can only be possible if the two 
applications explicitly declare the usage of the same sharedUserID feature. Besides, 
they need to be digitally signed by the same author [29]. 
 File access 
Android implements Linux ownership and permissions security mechanism [29].  Both 
application files and system files are exposed to these security mechanisms. Every file 
in Android is related to the owner’s user ID and group ID. Additionally, the users and 
the group members can be assigned any combination of the three Read (r), Write (w), 
and eXecute (X) permissions. 
In Adriond, the Linux kernel enforces read and write privileges   on the owner while the 
users in the same group with the owner have write permission and the rest of the users 
are given execute permission [29]. 
Normally, in Android, user of an application owns the application file whiles either the 
system or root user owns system files.  Ensuring file access security involves assigning   
various users to every application and system files together with correct permission 
configurations. 
Besides, the Linux kernel treats various functions in the system as pseudo-files.  
Therefore, the use of file access mechanism makes it possible to set permissions on 
drivers, terminals and hardware sensors. Permissions can also be set on power state, 
audio, direct input readings and the like [29]. 
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2.4.2 Environmental Features 
Environmental features comprise the hardware, programming language and mobile 
carrier mechanisms that contribute to improve the security of Android platform.  The 
specific technological factors that need to be considered in Android security are 
memory management unit, type safety and mobile carrier security features [29]. 
Memory management unit 
Memory management unit is a hardware component that enables separation of 
processes into distinct address spaces. Linux, like any other operating system is 
required to have memory management unit to make sure that no process can read or 
corrupt the memory pages of another process. The use of this mechanism can prevent 
information disclosure and also reduce the probability of privilege escalation [29]. 
 Type safety 
This is a property of a programming language. It is required that contents of a variable 
maintain a certain format in order to eliminate the possibility of misuse. The absence of 
type safety and boundary checks can result in memory corruption and buffer-overflow 
attacks. These attacks can further lead to execution of arbitrary code [29]. 
 Mobile carrier security features. 
 The security features of telephony systems originate from the need to identify users, 
monitor usage and charge subscribers appropriately.  The approach to meeting these 
basic requirements is the implementation of authentication, authorization and 
accounting mechanisms into the telephony system.  As a platform for smart phones, 
Android makes use of these security attributes mobile phone design [29]. 
 2.4.3 Android-Specific Security Mechanisms 
In a bid to provide a secure platform, Android enforces the following security 
mechanisms: 
 Application permissions 
 Component encapsulation  
 Application signing 
   [1, 28-30]. 
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Application permissions. 
The permission mechanisms for Android applications limit applications to exact 
operations they can do. There are much built-in permissions in Android that control 
operations such as dialling the phone, taking pictures, using the Internet and the like. 
There is flexibility in Android that makes it possible for any application to declare 
additional permissions. In order to acquire permission, an application needs to explicitly 
ask for it [29]. Every application package has a related XML manifest file. A developer 
can assign permission labels to application using this manifest file.  Whiles permission 
labels defined for an application spells out its scope of protection, giving permissions to 
the components that make up an application is a means of specifying the access policy 
to defend its resources [1]. 
 Each permission has its related protection level. The protection levels for Android 
applications are designated as “normal,” “dangerous,” “signature,” and “signature-or-
system.” During installation of Android application, the protection levels of the 
permissions that are asked for are verified. Permission whose related protection level is 
normal is granted all the time. Permission which has dangerous protection level can not 
be given to application without approval from a user. This type of permission might 
grant access to private data or sensitive utilities on the mobile device. A permission that 
is protected by signature is given to only applications that are signed using the same 
developer key that signed the application declaring the permission. The “signature - or -
system” protection level functions in similar fashion as signature protection. 
Additionally, it can also be given to applications installed in the system image [28, 29]. 
The system gives the permission requested to applications requesting it during 
installation time. Granting of the permission is based on user’s approval and signature 
checking. After installation, the application can no longer make any permission request. 
This means that any operation that has not been approved during installation time will 
not be successful at execution time [28, 29]. 
 Component encapsulation. 
Android application can prevent other applications from accessing its components. This 
is achieved through a process known as component encapsulation.  This happens 
mainly by declaring the “exported” property of the component [29].  Given that this 
property is made “false”, only application that owns the component in question and 
other application that share the same user ID can gain access to it. Providing the 
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“exported” property is set to “true”, other applications can gain access to it. Developers 
should set the “exported” property physically since there might be a discrepancy 
between the default encapsulation policy and the one expected [1, 29]. 
 Signing applications 
 Every Android application is put in a package named apk archive [29], meant for 
installation. The prerequisite of Android applications is that all the installed applications 
need to be digitally signed. The package is considered valid provided that its certificate 
is useful and acceptable. Additionally, the public key included must be able to confirm 
the signature. This mechanism is used to verify the origin of two or more Android 
applications. The approach is also very useful in SharedUserId method and permission 
mechanism to confirm signature and signature-or-system protection level permissions 
[29, 30] 
2.5 Modem Interface Services (MIS) 
The Modem Interface Service is a software component that runs on the host CPU in the 
host operating system environment. It is designed to provide a bridge solution in the 
Android platform. The MIS can be considered as the “peripheral driver” for the Modem 
and it is intended to make the modem fit into the Linux-based host system. 
The application system in the platform is called the host and the modem is thought to be 
a “peripheral.” The modem consists of hardware and software components meant to 
provide platform services to the external host system.  It is used for configurations such 
as bridge, pc-cards and USB dongle [6]. Figure 5 presents detailed description of the 
Modem and Host relationship. 
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MIS Application 
System
Linux
Host Hardware
Modem
RIL Bridge Relay
CAIF socket broker
RFM
MID
CAIF MFA
Modem Update Application
Modem Log Daemon
 
                                   Figure 5: Host and Modem Relationship 
This figure was drawn based on the official picture ST-Ericsson uses to show detailed 
description of the platform. 
 
2.5.1 Modem Interface Services Modules 
The design of the MIS component is in modular format.  The MIS consists of a number 
of modules working together as a unit to implement the bridge solution function. The 
modules that make up the MIS are ModemInitDaemon (MID), Modem Flashing 
Application (MFA) and Remote File Manager (RFM). Others are Radio Interface Layer 
(RIL), Inter Process Communication Multiplexer (CAIF) and ModemLogDaemon. The 
rest are ModemUpdateApplication, BridgeRelay and CAIF Socket Broker [6]. 
ModemInitDaemon 
The MID module in the MIS component controls the modem in that it starts and stops 
the   modem as well as monitors it.  It also coordinates all service-associated functions 
of the modem namely flashing and update. Additionally, the MID gathers crash reports 
from the modem [6]. 
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Radio Interface Layer 
The RIL is MIS component. It is the main mechanism used to integrate the modem in 
Android platform.  The RIL enables modem - supported services in the platform. To 
communicate with the modem, the RIL uses the D-bus. For instance, it uses the D-bus 
API to perform modem initialization [6]. 
Modem Flashing Application 
The MFA module runs loader protocols in order to flash flash-based modems. 
However, this function of the module is not used when flashless modem is being used. 
This module is also responsible for tunnelling used in the course of service and flashing 
from a computer [6] 
Remote File Manager 
The RFM is a Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) remote file system server. 
A flashless modem uses this module to store non-volatile data [6]. 
ModemLogDaemon 
This module is responsible for receiving records from the modem and writes them to 
the file system on the host [6]. 
ModemUpdateApplication 
The ModemUpdateApplication gives information about new firmware to a flash –based 
modem. This function is not used for a flashless modem [6]. 
BridgeRelay 
The BridgeRelay implements tunnelling functions. These functions of the module are 
needed in the factory and during research and development [6]. 
CAIF Socket Broker 
This module in the component provides inter process communication multiplexer 
sockets to user space. Besides, it serves as an interface to Field Test Display and CIQ 
[6]. 
2.5.2 Modem Interface Services Security 
The security implementation in the MIS follows the general Linux security in that each 
application run as a separate user. MIS does not implement enhanced security functions. 
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The Linux kernel on which MIS runs is either in an open or locked mode. When the 
kernel is in open mode, the mobile device is said to be open and when it is in locked 
mode the device is termed locked device. 
When the device is in locked mode, software that is not operator signed cannot be 
loaded on the device. With this configuration, MIS security depends entirely on Linux 
security and is the basic means of protecting all sensitive data.  Conversely, a user may 
alter the kernel if it is not in a locked mode to allow access to any MIS data.  
The MIS contains no sensitive data. However, the MIS configuration file may be at risk 
if the device is open. Malicious changes in the configuration file could cause the whole 
device crash. Moreover, misaligning the GP10s in such away that the ones in the 
direction of the modem are powered when the modem is off may damage the modem. 
The MIS executables run as regular users and are assigned the needed capabilities to 
carry out operation. However, some modules are given special capabilities in order to 
function. Particularly, MID, BridgeRelay and RFM start with root privileges but drop 
the privileges in the course of start up [6]. 
2.5.3 MIS Security Solutions 
The security solution for the various modules in the MIS component is founded on 
Linux functionality. Security setting for each executable depends on the functions of the 
module. The following section describes security setting for the main executables: 
MID executables 
The MID executable starts as a root user. However in the course of the start up, it 
switches to become a “system” user and be a member of the radio group. It is assigned 
the privileges required to start and stop services. Additionally, the MID opens 
privileged resources at start up before changing to system user. 
MID is assigned the following capabilities required for it to carry out its normal 
operation: CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_RAW, CAP_SYS_BOOT and 
CAP_SYS_MODULE.  Furthermore, the radio group and user owns /dev/h510 device 
[6]. 
MFA executables 
The MID module starts MFA module. In view of the fact that MID belongs to the radio 
group and runs as the system user, MFA   will be assigned the same user and group 
when MID starts it. This user and group are given the permission to access the 
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/dev/tty02 device. Besides, the system user and the radio group can access / data/ste 
/modem directory [6]. 
RFM executables 
The remote file manager starts with root privileges and opens Dbus connection. It then 
drops the privileges during the start up. The module is assigned the following 
capabilities required to perform its usual operations: CAP_NET_ADMIN, 
CAP_SYS_CHROOT and CAP_CHOWM. The user and group of RFM can be changed 
by configuration means from “init.rc” [6]. 
BridgeRelay executables 
The BridgeRelay starts with root privileges and drop the privileges in the course of the 
start up. It then switches to radio user to become a member of the radio group [6]. 
LifeCycleLogger executables 
This module runs as radio user and belong to the Bluetooth group [6]. 
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Chapter 3 Research Method 
This chapter consists of the approaches used to analyse the MIS component for security 
vulnerabilities. In the following sections, the various approaches and the tools used are 
explained in detail including their suitability to analysing software for security 
vulnerabilities. 
3.1 MIS Security Analysis Approach  
Software vulnerabilities are errors that attackers can use to compromise software 
systems. These errors can be defects in the software design and implementation as well 
as testing and operation. However, software vulnerabilities can be classified into two 
[22], namely:  design level flaws and implementation level errors. Therefore, security 
analysis of the MIS module is based on this classification. The approach used to detect 
implementation level vulnerabilities is source code analysis.  
The existence of design error in the software can create an opportunity for an attack 
even if the software does not have any implementation error. For instance, lack of 
authentication between two interactive components is architectural flaw and can not be 
detected using static code analysis [22]. Therefore, TVRA method is employed in this 
analysis to identify architectural vulnerabilities.  Architectural vulnerability analysis 
consists of known vulnerability analysis, ambiguity analysis and underlying platform 
vulnerability analysis [22].  TVRA methodology captures the three architectural 
vulnerability analysis approaches in its method process.  Thus, it is applied to MIS 
security analysis. 
As discussed in chapter [2.3], attack trees analysis is a systematic and well structured 
means of detecting possible vulnerabilities in systems. It is possible to employ this 
method as part of risk analysis process and it can be applied to detect security 
vulnerabilities at design level and development stage [34]. Hence, this method is used 
addition to TVRA approach and static code analysis in this research work. 
3.2 Code Analysis Tools 
There exist several static code analysis tools for analysing source codes written with 
C/C++ language.  Some are designed for commercial purposes while others are open 
source and can be used freely. Some are also platform specific whereas others are 
platform independent   and function on several platforms such as Linux and Windows 
machines.  
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This section focuses   mainly on the tools used to perform the analysis on the MIS 
component. In this analysis, the following four static code analysis tools were used:  
 Flawfinder 1.27-3 
 RATS 2.3-1 
 Cppcheck 1.54 
 Yasca  2.21 
These tools are selected based on the type of language used for writing MIS code. Since 
no static analysis tool can detect every security problem in a program, the use of four 
tools for the analysis will lead to better results.  In the following section, detailed 
description of these tools is made. 
3.2.1 Flawfinder  
Flawfinder is an open source tool that scans source code to detect possible security 
vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities detected are organized according to risk level. The 
tool functions on UNIX as well as Linux systems [35].  
The tool has a built-in database of C/C++ functions with well-known security problems 
such as buffer overflow risks, format string problems, race conditions and poor random 
number acquisition. Thus, its capability depends on the database which comes with it.   
The output of flawfinder analysis contains a list of potential security flaws called “hits” 
which are organized according to the risk level.  In fact, not all the problems that can be 
detected using this tool are security vulnerabilities and it is also true that not all 
vulnerabilities can be detected using Flawfinder [35]. 
3.2.2 RATS 
 RATS is an acronym which stands for Rough Auditing Tool for Security. It is an open 
source tool developed for analysing source codes for security vulnerabilities. RATS as a 
static analysis tool can be used to scan source codes written in C, C++, Perl, PHP and 
Python. The tool generates a report at the end of a scan which highlights common 
security related errors. The result also gives a description of the problem and potentially 
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suggested remedies. The tool cannot find every error. Neither does it detect only 
problems that are vulnerabilities. In fact it only performs a rough analysis of source 
code [36]. 
3.2.3 Cppcheck 
Cppcheck is a static source code analysis tool that is used to analyze codes written in 
C/C++ languages. This tool can operate on any platform and detects some bugs that 
cannot be detected by the C/C++ compilers. However cppcheck has its own limitation. 
It cannot detect all possible bugs in a code. This tool can be operated in a command line 
mode as well as in the GUI mode [37]. 
3.2.4 Yasca 
Yasca is an open source static analysis tool that scans source codes for security 
vulnerabilities as well as check for code quality. It also checks for performance of the 
code and its conformance to best practices. 
Yasca can scan source codes written with many languages. It actually leverages other 
static analysis tools when it has to scan specific file types. Yasca contains many custom 
scanners which are Yasca specific. The tool is used in the command line mode and it 
generates reports in HTML format. It has a plug-in architecture hence it can be 
extended [33]. 
3.3 Security modelling tools 
In the field of science, when analysing a specific problem, it is normal to construct an 
ideal and slightly simpler models of the problem that will help to comprehend the 
phenomenon by assessing the models with respect to reality. It is therefore usual for 
security researchers to model systems and attacks from security perspective [31]. 
Modeling security is a vital aspect of software security. Particularly, it is a means of 
creating awareness of security situations [26]. In this research work, two modeling 
tools, SeaMonster and UML were used to model security in the MIS components. A 
brief description of these tools is made in the following section. 
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 SeaMonster 
This is a graphical security modeling tool. The base of this tool is a set of eclipse 
frameworks. It can be applied   to model security activity graphs and attack trees. 
Additionally, it can be employed in modeling misuse case diagrams as well as 
vulnerability case graphs [26]. 
This tool was used to model various attacks against the platform taking into account 
security vulnerabilities in the MIS. 
 UMLsec 
UML is a modelling language. There exists no modelling tool for UMLsec. 
Nonetheless, UML editor can be extended to bring in UMLsec [26]. In this research 
work, Microsoft Office Visio 2003 was used to model UML model diagrams and the 
block diagram. 
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CHAPTER 4   Research Results 
4.1 Applying the TVRA Methodology 
As discussed in chapter three, the TVRA methodology provides a systematic procedure 
for discovering possible security vulnerabilities in telecommunication systems. 
Applying this method to analyse security in the MIS is a means to identifying design 
flaws.  
4.1.1 Target of Evaluation 
The goal of this approach is to carry out security analysis on the MIS and the 
interfacing Modem. The objective of using this approach is to find vulnerabilities that 
exist in the system due to architectural errors. The modem and the MIS form the 
environment of this analysis while the Radio Interface Layer (RIL) is the asset under 
analysis. The analysis focuses on identifying vulnerabilities in the RIL component. As 
shown in Figure 1, RIL is the MIS component that interfaces Android telephony layer 
and links the modem to Android applications in the upper layer. Its main function is to 
process all communication with radio hardware and sends calls to the RIL daemon.  
Since RIL exists in the MIS and its functions are part of the overall functions of the 
MIS, any attack or malfunction on the part of RIL will certainly affect the whole 
system. The main focus of the analysis is then on finding those vulnerabilities that will 
affect the operation of the modem.  Figure 6 presents the main assets in the environment 
of this analysis. 
-integratemodem() : void
RIL
-controlmodem() : void
MID
-servefile() : void
RFM
-provideservice() : void
MODEMMIS
#D-bus *#D-BUS*
*
#D-bus*
1
1
 
                          Figure 6:  Target Asset and its environment 
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Knowing the security environment of the MIS and the modem is crucial in analysing 
RIL for security vulnerabilities. Table 1 in Appendix B presents the needed information 
on the security environment for analysing the RIL. 
As discussed in chapter [ 2.], the MIS provides bridge solution for the modem in 
Android platform which runs on Linux kernel. The modem provides the platform 
services to the external Host system. The MID controls the modem while the RIL 
enables modem-supported services. The RFM   acts as the file server to the modem. 
The identified possible threats to MIS and the modem are: 
 Loss or corruption of data 
 Unauthorized access 
 Denial of service 
 Masquerade 
4.1.2 Security Objectives 
The role of RIL in the MIS makes it an important component. The RIL should ensure 
availability of   modem supported services.  Additionally, it must ensure that the 
services are accessible by authorized entities or applications. However, the availability 
of the modem itself is the responsibility of the entire MIS. Since the file system is 
mounted on the Host, the MIS should ensure integrity of modem-related data on the 
Host. Table 2 in appendix B shows information on security objectives for RIL and MIS. 
4.1.3 Security Requirements 
The security requirements for RIL and its environment depend on the identified 
objectives. The requirements consist of security functional requirements and assurance 
requirements. However, in this thesis work, only security functional requirement are 
determined.  The RIL is designed to meet the following functional requirements: 
  Initialise the modem to provide  platform services 
  Ensure secure communication between the modem and Android telephony 
framework. 
 Relate with MID to keep track of the modem 
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The Android platform is designed to meet the following security requirements: 
 The MIS shall ensure integrity of modem related data 
 The MIS shall ensure secure communication among components and the modem 
 There shall be authentication between modules and the Modem 
Table 3 in appendix B depicts security functional requirements for RIL and the MIS as 
a whole.  As discussed in the chapter 2, vulnerability in an asset is modeled as a 
combination of weakness and threat to that weakness. Based on the security objectives 
of RIL and its environment, possible threats to the system have been identified. Table 4 
presents identified threats to the security objectives of the target asset and its 
environment. 
           
Threat                               Objective 
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Authenticity 
Denial of 
Service 
          √    
Loss or 
corruption of 
data 
          √              √  
Unauthorized 
access 
           √            √         √     
Masquerade            √            √              √ 
                                  Table 4:  Identified Threats to Objectives 
 
 
4.1.4   Inventory of the Assets 
 RIL is a software component which forms part of MIS component. In Android 
platform, the RIL is used to integrate the Modem into the platform. The purpose of the 
integration is to enable telephony services (example: call, data messaging and Network 
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services) provided by the Modem.  The RIL receives all the telephony requests from 
Android telephony framework and carry out mapping of the requests to the appropriate 
AT command. These AT commands are relayed to the Modem. In a similar fashion, the 
RIL translates AT commands from the Modem into a type of response Android 
telephony framework will understand. AT command is a means of invoking and 
controlling modem services [6, 27]. 
As mentioned in the preceding sections, RIL is the asset under analysis in this master 
thesis.  Therefore, the impact of attack on RIL to the system must be taken into account. 
Table 5 shows the impact of attack on this component to the Modem. 
                                     
        Impact          Explanation               value 
         High The Modem might be 
damaged using 
vulnerability in RIL 
                   3 
                                             Table 5:  Asset Impact 
 
4.1.5 Identification of Vulnerabilities 
To launch a successful attack on the MIS in general and the RIL in particular, an 
attacker must identify vulnerability in the platform. Vulnerability exists when there is a 
threat to a weakness in the platform. Therefore, to identify vulnerabilities in the RIL 
and its environment, weaknesses in the system must be identified. This analysis takes 
into account the flow of information in the D-Bus between the RIL and the modem as 
one attack interface to identify weaknesses. The other attack   interface used in the 
analysis is the RIL to MID communication over the D-Bus.  Analysis of the well- 
documented information on the platform reveals some design weaknesses which can be 
classified as follows: 
 Incorrect permission  assignment  for critical resource 
 Privilege dropping error 
 Missing encryption of sensitive data 
Further analysis shows that these weaknesses are exploitable using different attack 
methods.  Using information in well- documented Common Weakness Enumeration 
 Security on the MIS and the interfacing modem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 41 of 71 
 
(CWE) paper [21], the following possible attacks can be used to exploit the identified 
vulnerabilities:  
 Modification of data 
 Assuming of Identity/ Gaining privileges 
 Reading  of  files 
An attacker launches attack on a system taking into account the type of vulnerabilities 
that exist in the system. Table 6 presents the weaknesses in the target asset and its 
environment as well as their corresponding possible attacks.  
Weakness Possible Attacks 
Incorrect permission assignment for 
critical resource 
 
1. Modification of  data  
2.Gaining  privileges 
Privilege dropping error 
 
1. Gaining  privileges/Assuming identity 
Missing encryption of sensitive data 1.Reading of   files 
2. Modification of  data 
                                  Table 6:  Weaknesses and Possible Attacks                                  
In order to exploit vulnerabilities in any system, an attacker uses the method that is 
suitable and easy to carry out. As explained in the preceding section, the method also 
depends on the type of attack and the vulnerability. In this analysis, the identified   
methods which can be used to exploit the vulnerabilities are listed below:  
 Injection 
 API abuse 
 Protocol manipulation 
 Executing arbitrary code 
Detailed discussion of the vulnerabilities, the attacks and the attack methods is made in 
chapter 5. 
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4.1.6 Assessment of the Practicality 
The presence of vulnerabilities in any system is not a guarantee that an attacker can 
compromise the system. Therefore, in performing security analysis on a system, attack 
potential associated with each vulnerability identified should be determined. To do this, 
certain factors must be taking into account. In this master thesis work, the factors used 
to perform the analysis are defined in clause B.4 of the Common Criteria Evaluation 
Methodology. This information is available in ETSI’s paper on TVRA methodology 
[10].   
 
4.1.7 Calculation of the Likelihood of the Attack and Its Impact 
 The factors used to perform this analysis are time, expertise, knowledge and 
opportunity in addition to equipment.  In performing the analysis, worst case is assumed 
for the factors outlined to determine the attack potential for the vulnerabilities 
identified. Furthermore, weighted summation method is used to calculate the overall 
attack potential.  Table 7- Table 9 in appendix B present attack potential for the various 
identified vulnerabilities. 
The intensity of an attack on a system determines the risk related to the system.  Thus, 
in performing security analysis, attack intensity for each attack on the asset under 
analysis must be determined.  Moderate levels of multiple instances of attacks on RIL 
with a value of one are used in performing this analysis. Table 10 in appendix B 
presents information on attack intensity on the RIL. 
 
Vulnerability Ratings 
Vulnerability ratings are used to determine feasibility of an attack on the platform. The 
overall attack potential values are used to rate the vulnerabilities. Table 11- table 13 in 
appendix B present the rating for the identified vulnerabilities. The results of the rating 
show that the identified vulnerabilities have high resistant to the attacks. The 
vulnerability rating parameters obtained are then used to determine the likelihood of an 
attack on the platform using any of the vulnerabilities identified. Table 14- table 16 
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present the mapping of the vulnerabilities to likelihood of attack. The analysis shows 
that it is not likely for an attacker to exploit these vulnerabilities. 
 Vulnerability Rating  Likelihood      Value 
   High Unlikely         1 
  High Unlikely         1 
Table 14: Likelihood of attack using incorrect permission assignment for critical 
resource 
 
Vulnerability Rating  Likelihood       Value 
 High Unlikely            1 
      Table 15:  Likelihood of attack using privilege dropping error 
 
Vulnerability Rating  Likelihood Value 
High Unlikely        1 
High Unlikely        1 
      Table 16:   Likelihood of attack using missing encryption of sensitive data 
 
4.1.8 Establishment of Risk 
Determining risk associated with each vulnerability in security analysis is a means of 
measuring the risk implication of an attack on an asset. In ETSI standards [10], risk is 
defined as the result of multiplying the likelihood of an attack and the impact the attack 
has on the target asset.  In this analysis, the impact of the various attacks on the RIL is 
obtained by summing the asset impact value (From Table 5) and attack intensity values 
(from Table 10). According to ETSI standard [10], the impact is measured from 1 to 3. 
Therefore any sum more than 3 is taken to be the maximum value which is 3.  Hence, 
the resulting impacts on the platform are 3. Table 17 in appendix B shows the 
calculation of the impact of attacks on the asset hence, the platform. The product of 
these values and that of likelihood of attacks (from Table 14 – table 16) determine the 
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risk values. Table 18 presents the risk values and their classifications. As shown from 
the analysis in Table 18, the risks associated with the vulnerabilities are major. Hence, 
mitigation strategies must be put in place to avert any eventuality. 
Likelihood of 
attack 
  Impact on 
Platform 
 Risk Value          Risk  Type 
         1              3        3           Major 
         1              3        3           Major   
         1             3        3           Major   
         1             3        3           Major   
                             Table 18: Risk Calculation and classification 
 
 
4.2 Applying the Static Code Analysis Methodology 
As discussed in chapter 2, Static code analysis approach provides the means of 
identifying implementation errors in programs. This approach of analysing software has 
been applied in this research work. The four static analysis tools mentioned in chapter 3 
were used in the analysis.  The idea of using four tools is to obtain better and accurate 
results from the analysis. 
The analysis was carried out using an older version of ST-Ericsson’s Radio Interface 
Layer (RIL) component source code.  The source code comprises forty-two files.  
Nineteen of them are C/C++ source files. The results obtained from scanning the source 
code are presented in the following sections.  
 
4.2.1 Flawfinder 1.27-3 Results 
Flawfinder was used on Linux (Ubuntu) platform to analyse the source code. 
Running the test with this tool, 16 files were checked and 17422 lines of code were 
analyzed from which 151 problems were detected. 
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With flawfinder, errors detected are classified according to severity levels starting from 
zero to five. By default, one is the minimum risk level. The output of the analysis 
contains information about the type of errors in the code, their severity level and the 
possible attack description. Table 19 shows discovered implementation errors in the 
source code and the possible attacks against the system using these vulnerabilities. 
Table 20 depicts the severity levels and the number of errors at each severity level.  
 
Error type Possible Attacks 
(Buffer) char Program crash, Data corruption, Malicious code execution 
(Integer) atoi Program crash, Data corruption ,Arbitrary code execution 
(buffer) 
memcpy 
Program crash, arbitrary code execution, Subversion of other security 
services 
(Misc) open  
(Buffer) strcpy Program crash 
(Buffer) read Program crash, Data corruption 
(Buffer) strncpy Program crash, Data corruption 
(Obsolete) 
usleep 
Old function 
(port) snprintf Buffer overflow 
                                    Table 19 Vulnerabilities and Possible Attacks 
 
Severity 
Level 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Number 
of 
Errors 
0 69 66 1 15 0 
                                                  Table 20   Error Severity 
 
 
4.2.2 RATS 2.3-1 Results 
RATS analysis tool was also used on Linux (Ubuntu) platform to analyse RIL source 
code. Analysing the source code with this tool, all the 19 C/C++ source files were 
checked and 15904 lines of code were analyzed. From this, 43 problems were detected.   
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The output of the analysis contains a list of the vulnerabilities present in the code and 
their severity level. Table 21 shows implementation errors detected in the source code 
using this tool. It also contains information about   possible attacks against the system 
using these vulnerabilities. Table 22 depicts the severity levels and the number of errors 
at each severity level.  
 
Error Type Number Possible Attacks 
fixed size local buffer 24 Buffer overflow 
strcpy 14 Buffer overflow 
getopt 1 Buffer overflow 
sprintf 1 Buffer overflow 
read 3 Buffer overflow 
                                  Table 21 Types of Errors and Possible Attacks 
 
Severity Level High Medium 
Number of errors 40 3 
                                      Table 22 Errors Classification 
 
4.2.3 Cppcheck 1.54 Results 
Cppcheck analysis tool was used on windows vista platform to analyse the RIL source 
code. The tool was used in the GUI mode and the output report generated is in xml 
format. Analysing the source code with this tool, all the 19 C/C++ source files were 
checked and from this, 43 problems were detected.   The output report of the analysis 
lists the flaws present in the code and indicates their severity level. Cppcheck classifies 
implementation flaws as error or warning depending on their severity. However, the 
output report does not show the number of lines analyzed and attack description. Table 
23 shows vulnerabilities detected in the source code using this tool. It also presents 
possible attacks against the system using these vulnerabilities. Table 24 shows the 
statistics on the classification of the vulnerabilities with respect to severity level.  
 
 Security on the MIS and the interfacing modem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 47 of 71 
 
Error type Number Possible Attacks 
Null Pointer 11 Availability-Failure of 
the process 
Memleak 1 Reliability problem-
Denial of service attack 
SelfAssignment 2  
Invalidscanf 3 Program crash 
                              Table 23 Types of Errors and Possible Attacks 
 
Severity Level Error Warning 
Number of Problem 12 5 
                              Table 24 vulnerabilities Classifications 
4.2.4 Yasca 2.21 Results 
Yasca static analysis tool was used on windows vista platform to analyse the RIL 
source code. The tool was used in the command line mode and the output generated in 
html format. 
 Analysing the source code with this tool, 13 of the C/C++ source files were checked 
and from this, 123 problems were detected. The output report of the analysis lists the 
flaws present in the code and indicates their severity level. Yasca classifies 
implementation flaws into three categories namely, critical, warning and low. The 
generated report also contains information relating to consequences of these 
vulnerabilities. But, the output report generated does not show the number of lines 
analyzed. Table 25 shows vulnerabilities detected in the source code using this analysis 
tool. It also describes possible attacks against the system using these vulnerabilities. 
Table 26 presents the data on the classification of the vulnerabilities about their severity 
level. Detail information relating to this analysis can be seen in the output report in 
appendix B. 
 
Error Type Number Possible Attacks 
Weak Credentials 
(password) 
2 Brute-force attack 
Use after free 41 Program crash, 
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unexpected value, 
arbitrary code execution 
Unsafe/banned Function 68 Memory corruption 
Improper Null 
Termination 
1 Buffer overruns 
Double free 11 Memory corruption, 
Buffer overflow 
                         Table 25Types of Errors and Possible Attacks 
                       
Severity Level Critical Warning Low 
Number of error 2 40 23 
                      Table 26   Vulnerabilities Classification 
 
4.3 Applying the Attack Trees Methodology 
The main purpose of applying this method to analyse MIS security is to model attacks 
against the platform. As mentioned in chapter three, this approach helps to identify both 
design flaws and implementation errors. 
Every attack on a system has a goal. In this thesis work, the goal is to attack the 
modem. The idea is to prove how possible it is to attack the modem using 
vulnerabilities in MIS components. To perform the attacks, use is made of well 
documented vulnerabilities and attacks against software systems. This information is 
available at various sources including National Vulnerabilities Database (NIST), SANS 
Institute, papers [21]. The various attacks obtained from these sources are classified 
according to identified security objectives of the target component. 
4.3.1 Selecting Key Assets 
The attack tree analysis is based on the main assets identified in the preceding section. 
The analysis starts by choosing some vital assets as the focal point of the analysis. 
These assets are selected taking into account the platform –supported services and the 
flow of information among the components. The key factor to consider in this case is 
what critical components affect the modem and what happens if they are attacked or are 
not functioning. 
4.3.2 Modeling the Attacks 
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As mentioned in chapter two, the MIS consist of a number of components. However, in 
analysis of this nature, the asset to protect and the target asset should be identified.  In 
this Master thesis project, the modem is the asset to protect while the RIL is the target 
asset. 
The RIL interfaces Android components and plays very important roles in bridging the 
modem to Android applications in the upper layers. Therefore, it is more susceptible to 
attacks. Thus modeling this attack is focused on the RIL and its interaction with other 
MIS components. 
Figure 7 presents an attack tree describing possible ways to attack the modem using 
vulnerabilities in MID, RIL or RFM.  As there is no strict rule as to how to model attack 
trees [19, 34], top-bottom approach to modelling is used in this analysis. Thus the 
modem represents the main goal of the attack. The second level represents the main 
MIS components that link the modem and can be used to attack the modem. However, 
since this research focuses on RIL and its interaction with other components, the 
analysis takes into account possible attacks against this component. Thus, subsequent 
attacks are modelled to violate security objectives of RIL as the target asset. 
The third level in the attack represents the security objectives that the attacker intends to 
violate. The forth level in the attack tree represents the possible mechanisms an attacker 
can use to launch his attack on the modem. In the following sections, sub attack trees on 
each of the attack mechanisms are presented. 
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Figure 7: An attack tree showing possible attacks against the Modem 
Elevation of privilege is one of the mechanisms that can be used to attack the modem. 
This attack is intended to violate authorization and is further developed in the following 
section. Figure 8 depicts the possible attacks against the RIL using elevation of 
privilege.  
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Figure 8:  An attack tree showing possible attacks against RIL using elevation of 
privilege mechanism. 
The second means by which the modem can be attacked is to use Denial of service 
attack. This attack is intended to violate availability objective of the RIL thus the 
modem. Figure 9 shows various ways to implement this attack against RIL component.   
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Figure 9:  An attack tree showing Denial of Service attack against RIL 
The third mechanism that can be used to attach the modem is to violate the integrity of 
the RIL. Tempering data in MIS violates the integrity objective of the target asset. 
Figure 10 presents possible means of carrying out this attack using vulnerabilities in the 
RIL component and its environment. 
   
 Figure 10: An attack tree depicting possible attacks against the Modem 
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The fourth attack against the modem intends to violate authenticity objective of the 
target component by using spoofing mechanism.  Figure 11 shows how this attack 
against the system can be carried out. 
 
 
Figure 11:  An attack tree showing possible attacks against the RIL using spoofing 
attack. 
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4.3.3 Identified Vulnerabilities 
As mentioned in chapter [2. 3], an attack tree can be used to determine vulnerability of 
a system to an attack. In this analysis, Boolean values are used to determine 
vulnerability of RIL to a particular type of attack. The presence of possible value (P) in 
the attack trees indicates vulnerability while impossible value (I) shows that the 
component is not vulnerable to that particular attack.  In this section, vulnerabilities 
identified from the various attack trees are presented. 
A close study of the attack trees reveals the following vulnerabilities: 
 An attacker can exploit buffer overflow condition in RIL in order to elevate 
privileges 
 An attacker can use weakness in the permission system to elevate privileges 
 It is possible to launch Denial of service attack on the platform using buffer 
overflow condition in RIL 
 An attacker can overflow buffer in order to execute malicious code. This can lead 
to data modification. 
 It is possible for an attacker to assume identity in order to violate access control. 
In the following section, detailed discussion of the vulnerabilities and their implications 
is made. 
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CHAPTER 5 Discussion 
In this section, vulnerabilities identified from the three analyses are discussed. 
Additionally, possible mitigation strategies based on the vulnerabilities are presented. 
The information on the vulnerabilities and their mitigation strategies are based on what 
is in the Common Weakness Enumeration document. Further information on these 
vulnerabilities is available in NIST’s National vulnerability database version 2.2[21]. 
5.1 Vulnerabilities Identified in TVRA Analysis 
The vulnerabilities identified in MIS during TVRA analysis are essentially design 
flaws. From the analysis, these vulnerabilities are not likely to be exploited. But, the 
risk associated with exploiting them is major. Therefore, mitigation strategies must be 
introduced to prevent any incident.  In this section, discussion on the vulnerabilities and 
mitigation strategies is made. 
 Incorrect permission assignment for critical resource 
This type of vulnerability exists in programs when permissions are set on critical 
resources in a manner that attackers can read or modify the resource.  The platform 
under analysis is designed in a way that the file system is stored in the Host operating 
system file system. This means that the Host system must ensure integrity of the file. 
But, these files are not integrity protected.  An attacker using confused deputy problem 
method might modify data in the files. The result of this will be data loss or code 
execution which will cause the modem to malfunction. To prevent this, it is advisable to 
ensure that the configuration file, executables and libraries   are made read only. But the 
software’s administrator can have write permission. 
 Missing encryption of sensitive data 
Leaving sensitive data unprotected leads to security vulnerability. The calibration data 
software configuration data and other modem related data in the MIS are not integrity 
protected.  An attacker might corrupt the unprotected data on the mobile platform. 
However, it is practically not possible to modify the data using malicious applications if 
the data is encrypted with the right cipher mode. Therefore, the mitigation strategy to 
this vulnerability is to ensure that encryption is part and parcel of the system design.  
 Privilege dropping error 
This error occurs when a software component with root privileges fails to drop the 
privileges before handing out resources to other component which do not have the same 
privileges. MID in MIS starts as root and drops the root privileges during start up and 
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become a system user,  However, it uses the privilege to open resources before  
dropping them. As discussed in chapter [4.1.1], the MID controls the modem and also 
relates with RIL over the D-Bus. RIL uses the open resources to relate with MID and 
the modem. It is possible that the privilege will spread to other components including 
RIL. An attacker might exploit vulnerability in RIL to gain privileges. This will result 
in code execution, reading of data and possibly disabling of services.  Principle of 
separation of privileges can be used to mitigate this type of vulnerability. This 
mitigation strategy requires multiple conditions to be satisfied in order to access 
resources. It is also good to protect all communication channels that could be used to 
interact with MID. 
 
5.2 Vulnerabilities Identified in Static Code Analysis 
The vulnerability reports generated from analysing the source code are different. 
However, the vulnerabilities detected   in this analysis can be classified into categories. 
In this section, discussion on the vulnerabilities detected in the source code is presented. 
 Unsafe functions 
Analysis of the RIL code detected unsafe function errors in the code. These errors exist 
in the program because functions that are classified as potentially dangerous have been 
used during implementation. These functions introduce vulnerability into the 
programme. An attacker who intends to launch memory corruption attack can take 
advantage of errors of this nature. To prevent these types of vulnerabilities, a list of 
banned API functions should be provided and advice developers from using them. 
Additionally, it is advisable to automate static code analysis tools to check for these 
dangerous functions. Furthermore, an instruction can be given to the compiler to display 
utilization of these functions. 
 Weak credentials 
The code analysis also revealed the presence of weak credentials vulnerability in the 
source code.  This vulnerability exists   because a component does not make the use of 
strong password requirement for users. In this case, users are permitted to use weak 
passwords. With this vulnerability, it is easier for an attacker to compromise user 
accounts. It is also possible for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability in order to gain 
privileges or assume identity. It is a good design to require users to use strong 
passwords.  Absence of password complexity makes it easier for an attacker to guess 
password of users. To prevent occurrence of this type of vulnerability, strong password 
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usage should be enforced.  For instance, one can design a password policy that will 
contain the following attributes: 
 Minimum and maximum length of the password 
 Requirements on mixed character sets 
 No use of user name 
 Introduce password expiration 
 Not allowing reuse of password 
   
 Use after free 
The analysis shows existence of use after free errors in the code. The errors exist in the 
program because memory has been referenced after it is freed back to the memory 
management system. This vulnerability could result in a program crash, unexpected 
values, or even arbitrary code execution.  An attacker could exploit this condition to 
cause unavailability of RIL which will affect the Modem. The best strategy to avoid this 
problem is to use a language that will offer automatic memory management. It is also a 
good practice to ensure that when freeing pointers, they are sent to null. But, the use of 
multiple or complex data structures will render this strategy ineffective. 
 Double free 
Double-free vulnerabilities exist in the program. The cause of this condition is that a 
dynamically allocated memory is freed twice. A vulnerability of this nature can lead to 
memory corruption and perhaps a buffer overflow condition. An attacker could use this 
condition to crash the RIL in an attempt to launch denial of service attack on the 
platform. The mitigation strategy to this problem is to ensure that each allocation if 
freed just once. It is also a good practice to set the pointer to null after a chuck has been 
freed.  This will ensure that the pointer cannot be freed more that once. 
 Other Buffer related errors 
The other buffer related errors detected in the analysis are memory copy, memory leak, 
null pointer error and fixed size local buffer. The existence of fixed buffer in a program 
may result in a serious problem. The buffer may be too small to contain data during 
program execution. This condition could lead to buffer overflow. An attacker could 
exploit this condition to cause denial of service attack, execute arbitrary code or even 
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cause data loss. To avoid this problem, it is good to perform input validation on any 
numeric input in order to ensure that it is within the correct range. It is a good practice 
for developer to ensure that inputs satisfy both minimum and maximum conditions for 
the anticipated range. 
A null pointer dereference condition in the program is an error. This error can lead to 
program crash or exit. Usually,   a number of flaws such as race condition and 
programming omissions can cause this error in a program. An attack can exploit this 
vulnerability to crash the program thus causing denial of service attack or even execute 
unauthorized code. This problem can be avoided by checking the results of all functions 
that return a value and ensure that the value is not null. Another approach to solving this 
problem is to use a programming language that is not vulnerable to this problem. 
 Memory leak problem exist in the source code analysed.  This error occurs when a 
program uses assigned memory and does not release it well after use. The effect of this 
condition is the consumption of memory.  The problem can be caused by error 
conditions and other special conditions. Generally, this type of error results in software 
reliability problem.  Programmers who use C++ language can avoid this vulnerability 
by using smart pointer class specifically, std::auto_ptr. This class is defined by ISO/IEC 
14882:2003[21]. Further information on this class is available in the Common 
Weakness Enumeration document which is obtainable from NIST’s National 
Vulnerability database version 2.2. 
 Memory copy problems in software lead to buffer overflow. This condition occurs 
when a program copies an input buffer to an output buffer without ensuring that the size 
of the output buffer is more than the input buffer. An attacker can use buffer over flows 
to execute arbitrary code. In order to avoid this problem, a developer can run or compile 
programs with features that automatically offer means of protection that mitigates 
buffer overflow problems. 
5.3 Vulnerabilities Identified in Attack Trees Analysis 
This section presents discussion on the vulnerabilities identified from attack trees 
analysis. Analysis of the privilege elevation attack tree reveals that it is possible to 
escalate privilege. In this analysis, an attacker exploits weakness in android permission 
system to escalate privilege. The attacker using permission re-delegation can bypass 
MIS permission system in order to escalate privilege.  To achieve this, the attacker will 
use injection method to exploit buffer overflow condition in RIL in order to elevate 
privilege. It is also possible for an attacker to assume identity using the same 
vulnerability in RIL. This will also result in privilege elevation. 
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Analysis from Denial -of -Service attack tree indicates that it is possible to crash RIL in 
order to launch Denial- of -service attack on the platform. An attacker can use injection 
method to overflow buffer and execute arbitrary code. This will result in crashing the 
RIL, making Denial -of -service attack possible. 
The attack trees analysis also shows that it is possible to flout integrity objective of RIL. 
An attacker who intends to modify data can execute malicious code using buffer 
overrun condition in RIL. This will affect the operation of the modem. 
Furthermore, this analysis indicates that an attacker can violate authenticity. To achieve 
this goal, the attacker uses injection method to overflow buffer in RIL and assume 
identity. The attacker may send any AT command to the modem or carry out any 
operation defined by the AT interface. 
In the attack trees analysis, the possible attacks exploit two main vulnerabilities in the 
platform namely, buffer overflow condition in RIL and weakness in Android 
permission system. However, weakness in Android permission system is Android 
specific problem which is not investigated in this master thesis. To prevent buffer 
overflow attack from taking place, the following mitigation strategies can be adopted. 
 Use of a compiler that automatically checks bounds  
 Using  secure or safe functions that will not lead to buffer overflow condition 
 Using two or three static analysis tools to detect buffer overflow conditions in the 
software. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Further Work. 
The goal of this master thesis has been to perform security analysis on the Android 
mobile platform developed by ST-Ericssson. The main objectives of this analysis have 
been to detect security vulnerabilities in the MIS and the interfacing modem and to 
propose possible solutions to the identified problems to prevent unauthorized access to 
resources or modem damage. 
The challenge was how to approach this analysis in order to detect security 
vulnerabilities in the MIS that will affect the normal operation of the modem.  
MIS is a software component designed by ST-Ericsson to bridge their modem in 
Android mobile platform. The MIS consist of many components. However, the main 
component integrating the modem in Android platform is the Radio Interface Layer 
(RIL). Therefore, this analysis focused on identifying vulnerabilities in the RIL and its 
environment. 
To analyse security in MIS and the interfacing modem, three security analysis 
methodologies have been used. TVRA methodology was employed to detect 
vulnerabilities due to design flaws in the system. Static code analysis was used to detect 
implementation errors that make the platform vulnerable to attacks. To graphically 
show possible attacks against the modem and the relations among the attacks, attack 
trees methodology has been used.   
Performing the analysis using these methodologies made it possible to identify 
vulnerabilities in the RIL and its environment. Applying TVRA method to analyse MIS 
security revealed some design flaws in the platform. The code analysis results indicate 
the implementation errors in the source code.  The attack trees analysis shows possible 
means to attack the modem using vulnerabilities in MIS.   
Further analysis performed using TVRA methodology shows that the identified 
vulnerabilities due to design errors are not likely to be exploited. However, the risk 
associated with an attack on the platform using these vulnerabilities is major. Static 
code analysis and attack tree analysis revealed vulnerabilities that are exploitable. 
Based on the results obtained in the analysis, some mitigation strategies were proposed. 
This analysis and the results obtained show suitability of the methods used to analyze 
software systems for security vulnerabilities. Particularly, TVRA method can be applied 
to analyze design errors while code analysis can be used to detect implementation 
errors. Attack trees analysis can be employed to identify both design and 
implementation errors. 
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The results obtained from the analysis and the proposal of mitigation strategies to 
improve on MIS security are the main contributions from this Master thesis work.  
Regarding further work, it is worth mentioning that the MID being the main component 
in the MIS that controls the modem needs to be analysed in order to establish complete 
security status of the modem. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A       Glossary and Abbreviations 
 
 
Appendix B      Tables 
 
Table 1:  MIS Security Environment 
 
                                                                A Security Environment 
a.1      Assumptions 
TVRA- ID                          Summary 
a.1.1 MIS is used to provide bridge solution 
to  ST-Ericsson Modem to be 
integrated to a Linux base Host system 
a.1.2 MIS runs on Android Platform with a 
Linux Kernel 
a.2  Assets 
a.2.1 The Modem provides platform 
services to the  external Host system 
a.2.2 MID resides in MIS and starts, stops 
and monitor the Modem. It also 
coordinates all service –related 
functions of the Modem.  
a.2.3 RIL resides in MIS and initialises the 
Modem 
a.2.4 RFM  acts as  a file server for the 
modem 
a.3  Threats 
a.3.1 Loss or corruption of data 
a.3.2 Unauthorized access 
a.3.3 Denial of Service 
a.3.4 Masquerade 
a.4   Threat Agents 
a.4.1 Modification of resource, Injection 
a.4.2 Assume identity, Gain privileges 
a.4.3 Injection , Analysis 
a.4.4 Spoofing 
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  Table 2:  Security objective for Target Asset and Environment  
  
                                                          B    Security Objectives 
  b.1                                          Security objectives for  RIL 
b.1.1 The RIL should ensure the availability 
of  the services provided by the 
modem 
b.1.2 The RIL should ensure the service is 
accessible and usable on demand by an 
authorized entity or program 
b.2                                     Security Objectives for  MIS 
b.2.1 The MIS should ensure availability of 
the Modem 
b.2.2 The MIS should ensure integrity of 
Modem-related  data and  operations 
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Table 3:  Security Requirements for Target Asset and Environment 
 
                                                        C        Security Requirements 
c.1   RIL  Security Functional Requirements 
c.1.1 The RIL shall initialise the Modem to 
provide  platform services 
c.1.2 The RIL shall ensure secure 
communication between the Modem 
and Android telephony framework. 
c.1.3 The  RIL shall  relate with MID to 
keep track of the Modem 
c.2   MIS Security Requirements  
c.2.1 The MIS shall ensure integrity of 
Modem’s  data 
c.2.2 The MIS shall ensure integrity 
protected link between the Modem and 
the Host system 
c.2.3 There shall be authentication between 
modules and the Modem 
 
Table 7:   Attack Potential for Modification of data 
Factor Range Value 
Time    ≤  3 months               13 
Expertise      Expert                5 
Knowledge     Public                0 
Opportunity Unnecessary/ Unlimited 
access 
               0 
Equipment  Specialised                 3 
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Table 8:  Attack Potential for Assuming Identity/Gaining Privileges 
Factor Range Value 
Time     ≤ 3 months             13 
Expertise      Expert              5 
Knowledge      public               0 
Opportunity  Unnecessary/ Unlimited 
access 
              0 
Equipment   Specialised               3 
 
Table 9:  Attack Potential for Reading of files 
Factor Range Value 
Time    ≤ 3 months           13 
Expertise   Expert           5 
Knowledge    public            0 
Opportunity  Unnecessary/Unlimited 
Access 
           0 
Equipment  standard             0 
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Table 10:  Intensity Factor 
         Attack        Attack Intensity               Value 
Modification of data Moderate level of 
multiple instances 
                  1 
Assuming 
Identity/Gaining 
Privileges 
 
Moderate level of 
multiple instances 
                  1 
Reading of files 
 
 
Moderate level of 
multiple instances 
                  1 
 
                      
 
 Table 11: Vulnerability rating for incorrect permission assignment for critical resource 
Attack Potential Values  Resistant to Attacker with Potential 
Value of: 
         21  High 
         21  High 
 
 
Table 12: Vulnerability rating for privilege dropping error 
Attack Potential Values  Resistant to Attacker with Potential 
Value 0f: 
  21 High 
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Table 13:  Vulnerability rating for missing encryption of sensitive data 
Attack Potential Values  Resistant to Attacker with Potential 
Value of: 
   18  High 
   21 High 
 
 
 
Table 17:  Impact on the Platform 
Asset Impact  Attack Intensity       Resulting Impact 
       3       1            3 
       3       1            3 
       3       1            3 
 
 
